

Airbus Composite Structures

Perspectives on safe maintenance practice

Preliminary

- Good in service experience validates as well the certification as the design and safe maintenance practice.
- But findings/events may lead to modifications.
- The following presentation is to illustrate through 2 cases the changes that were necessary to introduce within the sandwich structure concepts (Design and Maintenance).

Airbus Composite Structures

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


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
1. Overview of Composites

Overview of Composites

A380 Composite applications



Overview of Composites




Overview of Composites

A380 Composites - Basic applications Sandwich structures



- Radome
- •Pylon Aft Access Panels
- •Empennages LE & TE panels
- •Floor panels
- Wing TE panels





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2. A320 Elevators


Content

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- ▶ Example of water ingress
- Water ingress mechanism
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


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Structure description




Structure description



Example of water ingress

- Upper panel
 - Inspection by thermography



- Affected areas
 - Trailing edge inserts
 - Bonding straps
 - Panel surface



Water ingress mechanism

It is a combination of several parameters

Structure: Discontinuity or/and Porosity of the Skin

Environment: Heat and Humidity

▶ A/C performance: Flight profile

All when combined together in a critical way, present for the panel risk of: Water Ingress

- Which Lead in most of the case to:
 - Deterioration on the honeycomb / skin bonding line
 - Delamination
 - Weight increase



Improvements

- In production
 - By adding one adhesive film
 - Systematic Water Leak Test

Post-mod

Paint Scheme
Adhesive
Additional Adhesive
CFRP Outer Skin
Adhesive
Fiber Glass Honeycomb Core

Adhesive CFRP Inner Skin Tedlar




- SB A320- 55-1024
 - ▶ 1 time thermography inspection mandatory at 10 Years
 - ▶ Re-protection with 1 additional layer of pore filler and new paint
 - ▶ All completed in 2002



Comparison pre and post-mod elevators

Sampling of 22 elevators in each configuration




- Post-mod / Post-SB elevators are also affected at lower extent
 - ▶ Trailing edge inserts
 - Bondings straps
 - ▶ Panel surface




Further Design Improvements

Trailing edge inserts




Further Design Improvements

Bonding straps replaced by mesh




Further Design Improvements

Bonding straps replaced by mesh



Further Design Improvements

Panel surface



- Origin:
 - Porosity from production
 - Unrepaired paint or structural damage
- Improvement:
 - New prepreg used in production with higher resin rate
 - Glass honeycomb replaced by Nomex
 - Low resin flow control



Conclusions

- Significant rate of findings on post-mod / Post SB 55-1024 elevators
- ▶ The mod. improved the situation but did not definitely preclude elevator water ingress
- Water cannot be left unrepaired on elevator composite sandwich primary structure
- ▶ To date, no future design improvement on sandwich can totally preclude water ingress
- Mandatory repeated thermography inspection is required





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3. A300/A310 Rudders

Content

- ▶ In service experience
- Original design
- Rudder Pre Post mod 8827
- Rudder Maintenance tasks
- ▶ Rudder specific inspection programs since march 05
- ▶ Rudder In service-findings since March 05
- Conclusions



In service experience

Pre Structural failure in flight


- ▶ Rudders showed satisfactory in-service experience:
 - No disbond issue
 - except AFRP panels declared unfit to fly if not retrofitted
 - No fluid ingress issue
 - No manufacturing issue
 - No repair/maintenance issue

Post Structural failure in flight

- Findings since implementation of AOTs
 - Most not covered by currently published inspection techniques
 - Upon operators' inspection initiatives (increased awareness versus sandwich inspections)



Original design





•In-service damage


- Large skin-core disbonding
- Due to the Aramid layer between the core and the carbon fiber skin (poor resin adhesion on Aramid)
- Production modification 5844 replaced the Aramid with Glass layer

Current status


▶ All affected rudders replaced (80)



Pre Mod 8827



Pre Mod 8827



•In-service damage

- Skin-core disbonding in the bottom area
- Due to the attachment of the Front Spar through the honeycomb.

Current status


AOT has been launched to inspect any damage and the status of the structure (contamination...) Production modification 8827 has modify the attachment


Pre Mod 8827

- Maintenance tasks
 - Zonal program (MPD section 6)
 - -ZL326-01/02-1 (2C): GVI of rudder
 - Structure program (MPD section 7)
 - -554003-01-1 (5Y): DET of rudder front spar forward face and internal structure, as far as visible
 - -554004-01-1 (5Y): SDET of rudder side panels GFRP blocks areas (non SRM repaired rudders only)
 - -554005-01-1 (5Y): SDET (tap test) of the rudder side panels
 - Unscheduled tasks
 - Lightning strikes, high lateral loads, hail impact...

Pre Mod 8827

Spar attachment principles





Pre Mod 8827


- Rudder event
 - See Flight Safety presentation

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Pre Mod 8827 - Post rudder event

Precautionary inspection AOT#1


- Precautionary fleet wide inspection of in-service rudders launched post even
 - -AOT's 55A6035 and 55A2035 dated 17-Mar-05
 - About 400 similar P/N rudders (pre mod 8827)
 - Detailed visual inspection plus a tap testing of specific areas
- Inspection was based on existing 5Y MPD and AMM tasks
 - Most of findings would have been captured during regular maintenance




ADDITIONAL TAP TEST LOCATION

Pre Mod 8827 - Post rudder event

- Precautionary inspection ELCH#1 (Elasticity Laminate Checker)
 - ▶ Inspection principle:
 - Principle : vacuum based tool:
 - Check for no stiffness changes
 - Allows checking correct skin bonding condition (inner not directly accessible)







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Pre Mod 8827 - Post rudder event

- Precautionary inspection (ELCH#1)
 - ▶ To allow checking for the bonding condition of skin to honeycomb core, 24 rudders have been deeply inspected:
 - Inspection of complete rudder skin panels with 75 mm grid
 - Allows identifying damages greater than 100 cm2 either at the inner or at the outer skin
 - ▶ Tap test follows to indicate whether or not outer skin is affected
 - ▶ All rudders were found to be in good condition





Pre Mod 8827 - Post rudder event

- Precautionary inspection AOT#2
 - Issued after rudder inner skin disbond finding
 - ▶ Limited to pre-mod 8827 rudders
 - ▶ AOT Inspection for:
 - correct drainage condition (visual)
 - fluid contamination traces (visual)
 - Inner skin disbond (tap test)

Results:

 No significant finding (few drains blocked and/or fluid stains, no tap test finding)








Pre Mod 8827 - Post rudder event

- Precautionary inspection (ELCH#2)
 - ▶ 2nd campaign in 2006 (5 airlines):
 - Inspection on specific features
 - Complete Panel borders
 - ▶ Trailing edge screws
 - hoist point surround
 - Grid pitch decreased to 50 mm
 - ▶ Detects disbond from 70 to 90mm
 - 12 aircraft inspected / no finding





Pre Mod 8827 - Post rudder event

- In service-findings since March 05
 - Disbond between skin and honeycomb core
 - lower front corner (inner skin)
 - Z-profile area above BR7 (inner skin)
 - skin disbond around hoist point (outer skin)
 - under lightning plate (investigation running)
 - Fluid ingress (including Skydrol through blind rivets)
 - Hoisting points (water)
 - Trailing edge screws (water)
 - Leading edge screws (Skydrol & water)
 - Spar (water)
 - Incorrect repairs
 - repair not correctly bonded
 - skin abraded up to core during sanding
 - excessive paint built-up => cracking



Conclusions (1/2)

- ▶ Until March 2005, rudders showed satisfactory in-service experience (except Aramid early design – unfit to fly)
- Rudder occurrences triggered
 - –2 fleet inspections (AOTs) + 2 sampling inspection (ELCh)
 - A 3rd inspection, repetitive, is coming
 - Increased awareness towards composite sandwich specificity

Conclusions (2/2)

- Recent experience since March 2005 showed unexpected rudder damage types:
 - Disbond (skin to core)
 - Fluid ingress & skydrol contamination
 - -Incorrect repairs
- Need to improve the inspection program and the associated NDT technique to cover invisible damages
 - ELCh, ultrasonic, X-Ray ...



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4. Key messages

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General

- Airbus continually evaluates the in-service performance of composites in order to evolve aircraft design and maintenance.
- Airbus also cooperates with other manufacturers, suppliers and airlines as part of the Commercial Aircraft Composite Repair Committee (CACRC) to include customer experience in future composite improvements especially sandwich designs
- Increased awareness towards composite sandwich and monolithic specificities.



Monolithic structures

- Wide use of monolithic structures
- More than 65 million flight hours reached with very good in-service behaviour
- ➤ The in-service experience of monolithic composite parts has validated as well the designs as the certification approach and the maintenance concept.
- Warning about the use of a given experience for other applications, other designs.



Sandwich structures

- ▶ Experience on these structures has revealed some weak points, most notably a lack of water tightness.
- ▶ New sandwich designs in used show good in-service behaviour
- Change in inspection programs are considered.
- In few cases, Sandwich is replaced by Monolithic, for instance about Elevators & Rudders.





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